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DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN NEEDLE INC. V.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE: ANTITRUST LAW
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JOHN O. GUNDERSON ∗
Cite as: John O. Gunderson, The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine in American
Needle Inc. v. National Football League: Antitrust Law Continues Its Path Toward
Rationality, 4 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 1 (2008), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v41/gunderson.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Thirty-two National Football League (NFL) teams battle one
another each week, but each of these teams has at least one thing in
common—Reebok, Inc., (“Reebok”) manufactures all of the uniforms
worn during play, all of the hats and jackets worn on the sidelines, and
each coach’s shirt, from Mike Holmgren’s polo shirt in Seattle to Bill
Belichick’s hooded sweatshirt in New England. This is due to a
trademark licensing agreement that the NFL entered into with Reebok
in 2000. 1 At first blush, this arrangement might seem like a clear
example of one of the great potential evils in American commerce—a
monopoly. Further review of the situation (and litigation) has
determined that it is not.
The primary goals of antitrust law are to protect American
commerce from “restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. 2006, Creighton University.
1
Richard Sandomir, Reebok Strikes Exclusive Deal with N.F.L., L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2000/dec/20/business/fi-2360.
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discrimination” 2 and to create a more efficient economy. 3 Antitrust
law exists to prevent companies from restraining trade through the
formation of trusts, 4 conspiracies, 5 and monopolies. 6 These words are
not defined in the Sherman Act itself, but according to MerriamWebster’s Online Dictionary, “monopoly” means “exclusive
ownership through legal privilege, command of supply, or concerted
action,” 7 a “trust” is “a combination of firms or corporations formed
by a legal agreement,” 8 and “conspiracy” is the act of “join[ing] in a
secret agreement to do an unlawful or wrongful act . . .” 9 As these
definitions indicate, it is wrong to assume a Sherman Act violation at
any time that there is only one competitor in a market. One example of
a legal single-competitor market is the market for NFL-licensed
apparel, which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled not to be
illegally monopolized by Reebok in American Needle Inc. v. National
Football League. 10
This article explains why the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement
with Reebok is considered legal and not a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. This article is divided into four parts. Part I provides a
look at the origins behind and the history of antitrust legislation in the
United States. Part II discusses the rise and fall of the intra-enterprise
2

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
4
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
5
Id.
6
Id. at § 2.
7
Monopoly – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Monopoly (last visited December 2,
2008).
8
Trust – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Trust (last visited December 2, 2008).
9
Conspiracy – Definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Conspiracy (last visited December 2,
2008).
10
American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir.
2008).
3
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conspiracy doctrine in American antitrust jurisprudence. This doctrine
provided that a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary could
satisfy the requirements of a conspiracy that could unlawfully restrain
trade under the Sherman Act. Had this doctrine not been overturned by
the Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. International Tube Corp.,
which ended forty years of existence for the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine, the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement would
likely not have been upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Part II also details
the Copperweld decision and describes how the Copperweld decision
has been expanded in the twenty-four years since the court decided
Copperweld. Part III explains the facts behind American Needle Inc. v.
National Football League and details the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
that case. Finally, Part IV provides analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s
decision and explains why the court made the right decision.
I.

ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

There are five main statutory bases for federal antitrust law in the
United States. 11 These are the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914, the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936, and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the
Clayton Act of 1950. 12 This section of the article will focus on the
Sherman Act, as American Needle Inc. v. National Football League
does not contain any claims made under any of the other four acts. 13

11

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 49 (2d ed. 1999).
12
Id. at 49 n.17. The first antitrust act, the Sherman Act, is discussed further in
this article. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act were largely
aimed at deterring large businesses from engaging in “exclusionary” practices with
respect to smaller businesses. Id. at 49. The Robinson-Patman Act made it unlawful
to discriminate between purchasers via price if that discrimination resulted in
reduced competition. Id. at 571–72. The Celler-Kefauver Amendments strengthened
the Clayton Act’s anti-merger provisions. Id. at 49.
13
See American Needle, 538 F.3d 736.
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The Sherman Act was debated and passed in 1890, and at that
time, most Americans lived in rural areas rather than in cities. 14
Economies around the world had been very dependent on agriculture
during the eighteenth century, 15 and the United States was no
exception. 16 American farmers were very independent, often living
alone on their land outside of towns and villages17 and generally only
working together during the harvest. 18
This fiercely independent spirit of the American farmer was
understandably shocked by the Industrial Revolution during the
second half of the eighteenth century. 19 Rural Americans felt
threatened by the economic power wielded by large firms such as
railroads. These feelings were only exacerbated by the eventuality that
these workers became dependent on the new, big companies to provide
them with machinery needed to farm more effectively and with the
transportation infrastructure to move what they produced. 20
There seemed to be only two options—Americans could either
live with the increasingly large corporations or rely on the government
to take over the corporations. 21 Neither option proved attractive
because Americans were largely as skeptical of the government as they
were of large corporations. 22 As a result, a third option materialized,
which encouraged breaking up monopolies rather than having the
government assume control. 23

14

LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 4 (2d. ed. 2006).
15
See id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 5.
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This new wave of thinking produced the Sherman Act. The
Sherman Act relies on two main provisions. 24 Section 1 of the
Sherman Act makes it unlawful to contract or conspire in such a way
as to restrain trade. 25 Section 2 of the Sherman Act goes a step farther
and makes it illegal for a company to monopolize or even to attempt to
monopolize. 26
Section 1 and Section 2 were both written using very broad terms,
which leaves the statute open to interpretation by judges. 27 The broad
language employed by the Sherman Act has achieved its goals. The
path of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine provides a perfect
example of courts not only being able to interpret the Sherman Act
broadly but also being able to reverse course when they deem it
necessary. 28
II. INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
There is no language in the Sherman Act that says that two
companies that are affiliated may avoid antitrust liability if they
combine their efforts to compete. A literal reading of the Act would
likely lead a reader to conclude that this sort of conduct should be
prohibited. This likelihood seems even more probable when a statute
is written broadly and invites judicial discretion as the Sherman Act
does. As such, there developed a line of Supreme Court cases that
prohibited this sort of conduct. The intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine was the product of Supreme Court jurisprudence that began
with United States v. Yellow Cab Co. in 1947 and lasted until 1984’s
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. The doctrine stated
that even a company and its wholly-owned subsidiary can engage in

24

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000).
Id. at § 1
26
Id. at § 2
27
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 11, at 7.
28
See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
25
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conduct that triggers liability under the Sherman Act. 29 The seemingly
odd result of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is that two or
more entities can act in such a way as to restrain trade—even though
they have the same owner and are, presumably, operating toward the
same ends. Though arguments against the doctrine arose to the
Supreme Court rather frequently, it was consistently upheld for just
under forty years. 30
A. Creation of the Doctrine: United States v. Yellow Cab Co.
In 1929, various owners of taxicab companies in Chicago, New
York, and other cities commenced talks with the goal of merging some
of the major cab companies. 31 Morris Markin was the controlling
shareholder of Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation (“CCM”),
which in turn owned 62% of the stock in Parmalee Transportation
Company (“Parmalee”). 32 Parmalee contracted with railroads and
railroad terminal associations to transport passengers and luggage
between the various stations in Chicago. 33 Parmalee then acquired a
controlling interest in the Chicago Yellow Cab Company, Inc.
(“Chicago Yellow”), which owned all of the stock of Yellow Cab
Company (“Yellow”), which owned and operated all of the Yellow
cabs in and around Chicago. 34
The next year, in 1930, Markin incorporated Cab Sales and Parts
Corporation (“Cab Sales”), which owned and operated all Checker
cabs in and around Chicago with licenses held by Checker Taxi
Company. 35 Markin then acquired a large interest in DeLuxe Motor
Cab Company—the third largest cab company in Chicago in 1929. 36
29

See Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218.
See id.; Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752.
31
Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 220–221.
32
Id. at 221.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 221–222.
36
Id. at 222.
30
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Therefore, by 1930, Markin owned the three largest taxicab companies
in Chicago. 37 Markin also had holdings in New York, Pittsburgh,
Minneapolis, and Michigan, 38 therefore creating a “large, nation-wide
obstacle[] in the channels of interstate trade” of the sort that the
Sherman Act is designed to tackle. 39
The United States sued Yellow Cab, Chicago Yellow, Parmalee,
Cab Sales, Checker, CCM, and Markin, claiming violations of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 40 Yellow Cab eventually made its
way to the Supreme Court, and in Justice Murphy’s opinion, the Court
held that “[t]he test of illegality under the Act is the presence or
absence of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce.” 41 The
Court continued, saying “[s]uch a restraint may result as readily from a
conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under
common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent.” 42 The Court held that “interrelationships of
the conspirators” are unimportant in determining whether the Sherman
Act applies to a particular situation. 43 The Court then cited its own
precedent for support of the proposition that the Sherman Act concerns
itself with “substance rather than form,” 44 meaning that for the
purposes of the Sherman Act, what is important is that trade is
restrained—it does not matter who does the restraining. The Court
took a very literal interpretation of the Sherman Act and reasoned that
neither who was restraining trade nor how the entities were related to
one another mattered for the purposes of Sherman Act liability. As
long as trade was restrained, a Sherman Act violation had occurred.
Thus was born the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.

37

Id.
Id. at 225.
39
Id. at 226.
40
Id. at 225.
41
Id. at 227.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. (citing Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933)).
38
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B. Affirmation of the Doctrine: Kiefer Stewart, Timken Roller Bearing,
and Perma Life Mufflers
Issues regarding antitrust liability involving conduct between two
related entities did not cease with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Yellow Cab. Over the next thirty-seven years, the Court was given
multiple opportunities to reverse course with regard to the holding in
Yellow Cab. 45 The Court held firm, however, and stood by the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine developed Yellow Cab.
Interestingly, many times the Court did not take the time to revisit
the rule from Yellow Cab and did little more than cite to Yellow Cab
(and later to the other cases that followed its precedent) without taking
a closer look as to why the rule was implemented or why it should
continue to be followed. 46 Justice Jackson looked critically at the
doctrine in one dissenting opinion, 47 but aside from this rather isolated
example, the justices seemingly blindly followed Yellow Cab.
1. Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
In 1950, the Court heard oral arguments in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 48 Kiefer-Stewart was an Indiana drug
concern who also engaged in a liquor wholesaling business.49 Seagram
and a company called Calvert were affiliated companies that sold
liquor to Indiana wholesalers. 50 Kiefer-Stewart sued, arguing that
Seagram and Calvert had conspired to fix the prices at which they
would sell liquor to Indiana wholesalers. 51 Among the defenses raised
45

See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 (1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
46
See, e.g. Kiefer-Stewart Co., 340 U.S. at 215; Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
341 U.S. at 599; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc., 392 U.S. at 141–142.
47
See Timken Roller Bearing Co. 341 U.S. at 606–608 (Jackson, J, dissenting).
48
Kiefer Stewart Co., 340 U.S. 211.
49
Id. at 212.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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by Seagram and Calvert was the argument that because the two were
affiliated companies, they were unable to violate the Sherman Act
because they were actually one company and unable to conspire. 52
The Court cited Yellow Cab in declaring that common ownership
does not “liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust
laws.” 53 With this holding, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
lived on among Supreme Court jurisprudence.
2. Timken Roller Bearing v. United States
Another example of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine came
a few years later in 1951 in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States. 54 In Timken Roller Bearing, the United States brought a civil
action against Timken Roller Bearing Company (Timken) for
allegedly violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 55 The case involved
agreements made as far back as 1909, in which Timken made
agreements with foreign companies to divide the world into territories
to which the entities would provide antifriction bearings. 56 The
agreements were made between 1909 and 1927, at which point
Timken acquired a significant portion of British Timken, Ltd. (“British
Timken”), which entered into the territorial agreements with Timken. 57
In 1928, Timken was involved in organizing Societe Anonyme
Francaise Timken, a French company that also provided antifriction
bearings. 58 The group then entered into agreements to “(1) allocate[]
trade territories among themselves; (2) fix[] prices. . .; (3) cooperate[]
to protect each other’s markets. . .; and (4) participate[] in cartels to
restrict imports to, and exports from, the United States.” 59
52

See id. at 215.
Id.
54
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 595.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 596.
53

9
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Among its arguments attempting to show that the court should not
have held that it restricted trade according to the Sherman Act, Timken
argued that the arrangement was a joint venture, which it argued
should exempt it from culpability under the Sherman Act. 60 The Court
disagreed with this argument and cited to Kiefer-Stewart for the
proposition that “[t]he fact that there is common ownership or control
of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact
of the antitrust laws.” 61
Timken Roller Bearing is significant, however, because it can be
argued that this case is where chinks in the armor of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine begin to appear. Though possibly only
intended for companies affiliated across national borders, Justice
Jackson provided a powerful dissent, in which he argued that
preventing American companies from creating foreign subsidiaries
(even if each only served a particular geographical area) may prevent
American companies from expanding into foreign markets. 62 Jackson
went on to argue that there must be two entities in order to conspire
because “a corporation cannot compete with itself.” 63 Jackson pointed
out that in cases in which the Yellow Cab rule was applied, what would
be legal for one company to do on its own became illegal when done
by two legally separate entities. 64 According to Justice Jackson, “that
result places too much weight on labels” 65 and “[the] decision [would]
restrain more trade than it [would] make free.” 66
3. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.
Though Justice Jackson voiced his disagreement with the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in Timken Roller Bearing, the Court
60

Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
62
Id. at 606 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 607.
66
Id. at 608.
61
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was not precluded from upholding the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine seventeen years later when the Court heard oral arguments in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 67 Perma Life
Mufflers is a notable case for two main reasons. First, the majority’s
opinion demonstrates that any potential movement toward overturning
Yellow Cab and abolishing the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that
may have begun with Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Timken
Roller Bearing had been quashed. 68 Second, Perma Life Mufflers is
important because it shows that after over twenty years, the Yellow
Cab decision still held strongly, as none of the Nine disagreed with its
application in Perma Life Mufflers. 69
Perma Life Mufflers involved a set of facts similar to all of the
other cases of its ilk. 70 In Perma Life Mufflers, a group of plaintiffs all
operated muffler shops under the name “Midas Muffler Shops”
pursuant to agreements entered into with Midas, Inc. 71 The plaintiffs
sued, claiming that Midas had conspired with, among others, 72 its
parent corporation, International Parts Corp. such that the parties had
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 73 International Parts Corp.
argued that because the defendants were all part of a single business
entity, they were legally allowed to act in concert as they had. 74 The
Court stood firm in again reaffirming the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine as it held “the fact of common ownership could not save them
from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate
entities.” 75 Despite being asked again how a corporation can
67

Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
Id.
69
Id.
70
See id.
71
Id. at 135.
72
The plaintiffs also alleged that Midas, Inc. had conspired with two other
subsidiaries of International Parts Corp. and six individual defendants. Id. These
defendants are irrelevant to the analysis of the case under the intra-enterprise
conspiracy doctrine.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 141.
75
Id. at 141–142.
68
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essentially collude with itself, the Court continued its bizarre line of
jurisprudence that made it unlawful to do so even if the entities
conspiring are held under common ownership.
Perma Life Mufflers is also very important for a second reason.
Any movement toward a reversal of the Court’s jurisprudence with
regard to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine that began with
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Timken Roller Bearing was
halted, as none of the justices who wrote opinions 76 in Perma Life
Mufflers even mentioned Justice Jackson’s dissent. 77 Seventeen years
had passed since Timken Roller Bearing had been decided, and
Jackson had only been on the bench for three of those years. It seems
apparent that his viewpoint questioning the rationale behind the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine had failed to gain any traction, and if
the doctrine were going to be overturned, the doctrine’s detractors
would have to wait.
C. Turning Point: Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.
The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Berger, elected to
change course with regard to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
with its 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp. 78 Between 1955 and 1968, the predecessor to Regal Tube Co.
(Regal) was located in Chicago and was a wholly owned subsidiary of
C.E. Robinson Co. 79 In 1968, Lear Sigler, Inc. (Lear) purchased Regal
and used it as an unincorporated division of Lear. 80 In 1972, Regal
was sold to Copperweld Corp. (Copperweld). 81 The sale agreement
76

There were four separate opinions written in Perma Life Mufflers by Justices
Black (majority), White (concurring), Marshall (concurring), Fortas (concurring in
the result), and Harlan and Stewart (dissenting). It is noteworthy that by the time that
Perma Life Mufflers was heard, Justice Jackson had been off of the bench for nearly
fourteen years.
77
See id.
78
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
79
Id. at 756.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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contained a five-year noncompetition clause that bound Lear and its
subsidiaries not to compete with Regal in the United States. 82 David
Grohne was one of Lear’s corporate officers and had previously served
as vice president and general manager of Regal before Lear’s
acquisition of Regal. 83 Grohne had acted as president of Regal after it
became a division of Lear after the acquisition.84 Soon after Regal was
sold to Copperweld, David Grohne sought to establish himself in the
steel tubing market against his former employer, Regal, and he
established Independence Tube Corp. (Independence). 85 Independence
contracted with Yoder Co. (Yoder) to supply a tubing mill by the end
of 1973. 86
Regal and Copperweld discovered Grohne’s plans and sent a letter
to Yoder that said that Copperweld would take “any and all steps
which are necessary to protect [the] rights under [the] purchase
agreement and to protect the know-how, trade secrets, etc., which
[Copperweld] purchased from Lear Sigler.” 87 Yoder then voided its
acceptance to provide Grohne with a tubing mill, which caused
Grohne to find another company to provide him with a mill and
delayed his entry into the steel tube market for almost nine months. 88
In 1976, Independence sued Copperweld, Regal, and Yoder under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 89 The jury returned a verdict saying,
among other things, that Regal and Copperweld had conspired to
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but, interestingly, that Yoder had
not been a part of the conspiracy. 90
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, noting
that Yoder’s exoneration had left a parent corporation (Copperweld)
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 757.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 758.
90
Id.
83
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and its wholly owned subsidiary (Regal) as the only entities involved
in the Section 1 conspiracy. 91 The Seventh Circuit questioned this
result, noting that conduct similar to the facts of Copperweld would
not give rise to a cause of action if the two parties were a parent
corporation and an unincorporated division of the parent. 92 Ultimately,
however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision on the basis that
liability ensues “when there is enough separation between the two
entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible.” 93
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision. 94
The Court examined the cases that provided the foundation for the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and found other grounds that the
past Courts could have used to decide Yellow Cab and Kiefer-Stewart
in the same way in which they had already decided 95 and that cases
that followed those two seminal cases do nothing more than cite
Yellow Cab or Kiefer-Stewart also could have relied upon other bases 96
unrelated to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit was not alone in acknowledging the strange
conclusion that a parent company was capable of conspiring with its
wholly owned subsidiary to restrict trade—Copperweld and Regal
were joined by the United States as amicus curiae in asking the Court
to overturn Yellow Cab. 97 According to the Court, the chief criticism
of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was that too much weight is
91

Id.
Id. at 758–59.
93
Id. at 759 (quoting Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d
310, 318 (7th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 761 (stating that Yellow Cab was distinguishable based on the fact that
the acquisitions were themselves illegal); id. at 764 (stating that Kiefer-Stewart was
distinguishable based on the fact that subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other
than the plaintiff).
96
Id. at 765 (stating that in Timken Roller Bearing, the defendant neither
owned a majority interest in nor controlled either of the conspirators); id. at 766
(stating that Perma Life Mufflers could be decided on the same grounds as KieferStewart).
97
Id.
92
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given to the fact that a subsidiary is separately incorporated, causing
the activity of one entity to be treated as the concerted activity of two
separate entities. 98 In other words, a parent corporation could act in
concert with a wholly-owned division of itself as long as that division
was not itself separately established as a corporation. The Court went
further, noting that Congress only intended the Sherman Act to be used
on a single firm when that firm threatens monopolization 99 and that
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is not intended to apply to activity that is
“wholly unilateral.” 100
The Supreme Court also noted that “internal agreements” of
companies do not arouse Sherman Act suspicion because (1) a single
firm’s officers do not pursue separate economic interests, so they “do
not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously
pursuing divergent goals”; 101 (2) internal coordination just as likely
results from efforts to compete as from efforts to “stifle
competition”; 102 and (3) coordination may be required for a business
to compete properly. 103 Furthermore, the Court noted its own
precedent that if a subsidiary is an unincorporated division, then
cooperation between it and its parent cannot violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 104 The Court also pointed out that a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary have “a complete unity of interest” 105 in the
same way that a parent company and an unincorporated division do.
The Court analogized that single entities, like Copperweld and Regal,
are “not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the
control of a single driver.” 106
98

Id.
Id. at 768; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
100
Id. at 768 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). See
also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
101
Id. at 769.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 770.
105
Id. at 771.
106
Id.
99
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D. Extension of Copperweld
The decision in Copperweld signaled not only a large shift in
Supreme Court jurisprudence by reversing a precedent adhered to for
almost forty years, but also, in time, changed what arguments could be
credibly made in front of courts with respect to single-entity issues in
antitrust. In the years since the Copperweld decision, the “single-entity
concept” has been extended far beyond its origins in which only a
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary could be declared a single
entity. 107 Now, even affiliated companies or individuals can also be
considered a single-entity with respect to the Sherman Act, depending
on the circumstances of the individual case. 108 This extension of the
Copperweld holding is the basis for the Seventh Circuit’s holding in
favor of the National Football League, its member teams, NFL
Properties, and Reebok with respect to the League’s decision to award
an exclusive licensing contract with respect to headwear. This
broadening of the Copperweld rule has been accomplished
incrementally through a number of cases, 109 but this article will only
examine two other sports-related cases to demonstrate courts’
approaches to extending Copperweld: Chicago Professional Sports
Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Association (Bulls II) and
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 110
The controversy in Bulls II arose as a result of the Chicago Bulls’
desire to broadcast more of their games on WGN, a “superstation”
based in Chicago that broadcasts nationwide to cable television
subscribers. 111 During the case, the National Basketball Association
(NBA) argued that the league should be treated as a single entity with
107

See id.
See Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National
Basketball Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006).
109
See, e.g. Jack Russell Terrier Network v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 407
F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); City of Mount Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Electric
Cooperative, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
110
Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593; Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
111
Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 595.
108
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respect to granting rights to televise its games. 112 The Seventh Circuit
pointed out in its Bulls II decision that the NBA’s argument requires a
decision to either treat the league as a single firm, thereby only
applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or to treat the league as a joint
venture, which would possibly invoke liability under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 113 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit did not answer this
question, though the court did point out that courts have come to both
conclusions. 114
Perhaps the most important statement that the Seventh Circuit
made in Bulls II was when the court proclaimed sports to be
“sufficiently diverse that it is essential to investigate their organization
and ask Copperweld’s functional question one league at a time—and
perhaps one facet of a league at a time.” 115 The court also stated that a
league may qualify as both a single entity and a joint venture at the
same time, albeit for purposes of antitrust analysis of different aspects
of the league. 116 With this said, it is instructive to look another NFL
case, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
Brown is slightly different from the other cases analyzed in this
article. While that case does not directly implicate either the upholding
or the reversal of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, the Supreme
Court did analyze whether the league constituted a single employer or
multiple employers for collective bargaining purposes. 117 The Court
had difficulty deciding how to characterize the league and ultimately
112

Id. at 596.
Id. at 599.
114
See id. (“Most courts that have asked whether professional sports leagues
should be treated like single firms or like joint ventures have preferred the joint
venture characterization.” (citing Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994);
North American Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc. 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978))); but see Bulls II, 95 F.3d at
599 (noting that Justice Rehnquist filed a strong dissent in NFL v. North American
Soccer League and noting also that the Fourth Circuit has concluded that the
Professional Golf Association should be treated as one firm for antitrust purposes).
115
Id. at 600.
116
Id.
117
See Brown, 518 U.S. 231.
113
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held that the league can be considered a “single bargaining employer”
with respect to hiring and paying practice squad players. 118 In Bulls II,
Judge Easterbrook noted that despite the fact that the NFL is “‘more
like a single bargaining employer’ than a multi-employer unit is not to
say that it necessarily is one, for every purpose.” 119
Having explained the basic origins of antitrust law in the United
States and the rise and fall of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,
it is now instructive to apply these concepts to the case at the core of
this article, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League.
III. AMERICAN NEEDLE INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
The National Football League (NFL) has been in existence for
almost ninety years, 120 and during its existence, the league has become
wildly successful by almost any measure, including attendance, 121
television revenue, 122 players’ salaries, 123 and franchise values. 124 The
118

A practice squad player is a player who practices with the team and can be
used to supplement the team’s roster should one of the team’s regular players
become unavailable due to injury or for some other reason.
119
Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 599.
120
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th
Cir. 2008).
121
In 2007, the NFL set a new paid attendance record with a total attendance
of 22,256,502 including all 333 preseason, regular-season, and postseason games.
This works out to an average attendance of 66,836. NFL Sets Attendance Record in
2007, available at
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d8077f84d&template=withoutvideo&confirm=true (last visited November 12, 2008).
122
Fox pays $4.3 billion to televise NFC games; CBS pays $3.7 billion to
televise AFC games. These contracts are for the 2006–2011 seasons and include only
Sunday afternoon games. The NFL also has a contract with DirecTV that includes
the 2006–2010 seasons for the satellite provider’s NFL Sunday Ticket package. Late
Season Games can be Moved to Sunday Nights, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1918761 (last visited November 12,
2008). In addition to these contracts, the NFL has a contract to televise Monday
night during the 2006–2013 seasons for $1.1 billion per year. Steve Kroner, Monday
Night Football to leave ABC for ESPN, S.F. CHRON., April 19, 2005, at A-1. The
league also has a six-year contract worth $3.6 billion with NBC to televise Sunday
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right to produce and market officially-licensed league apparel is the
basis of the lawsuit brought against the league, its member teams, NFL
Properties LLC (collectively, “the NFL defendants”) and Reebok
International Ltd. (Reebok) by American Needle Inc. (American
Needle). 125
The NFL is an unincorporated association of thirty-two
individually owned and operated franchises around the United
States. 126 The NFL’s member teams play over 250 games in a given
season, and it is these games that serve as the league’s product. 127 The
Seventh Circuit notes that although each team is an individual unit by
itself, no team can produce the league’s product—the games—
alone. 128 In this way, all of the league’s teams are inextricably bound
together, and each team’s individual success is linked to the success of
all of the others. 129 In other words, “it makes little difference if a team
wins the Super Bowl if no one cares about the Super Bowl.” 130 As
night games. Joanna Weiss, NBC: Sunday Night’s Alright for Football, available at
http://www.boston.com/ae/tv/articles/2006/07/24/
nbc_sunday_nights_all_right_for_football/ (last visited November 12, 2008).
123
NFL payrolls for 2008 range between $83.6 million (Kansas City) and
$152.4 million (Oakland). Pittsburgh’s Ben Roethlisberger is the league’s highest
paid player, earning $27.7 million between his salary ($2.5 million) and signing
bonus ($25.2 million). Larry Weissman, NFL Salaries ’08: Big Ben Smiling as
Highest-Paid Player, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2008-11-05-salaries_N.htm (last visited
November 12, 2008).
124
In 2008, Forbes Magazine found that the average NFL franchise is worth
over $1 billion. The league’s most valuable franchise is the Dallas Cowboys, which
Forbes estimates is worth $1.612 billion. Press Release, Forbes, Forbes Announces
2008 NFL Franchise Valuations: League Average $1 Billion For The First Time In
Any Professional Sport (Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
125
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir.
2008).
126
Id. at 737.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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such, the NFL sought to promote the trademarks of its member teams
and the league itself as a collective whole with the intention of
competing against other forms of entertainment rather than against one
another. 131
As a result of this intention to compete against other forms of
entertainment, the NFL teams created NFL Properties (Properties) in
1963. 132 Properties is given the dual responsibilities of both
“developing, licensing, and marketing the intellectual property the
teams own[], such as their logos, trademarks, and other indicia” and
“conduct[ing] and engag[ing] in advertising campaigns and
promotional ventures on behalf of the NFL and [its] member
[teams].” 133 Properties was given the power to issue licenses to
manufacturers of different types of team merchandise and apparel,
including flags, shirts, jerseys, and hats. 134
The last of these, the right to produce league-licensed hats, gave
rise to American Needle Inc. v. National Football League. 135 American
Needle (American Needle) owned a license to manufacture NFL
headwear for over twenty years. 136 During this time, Properties
allowed multiple companies to hold headwear licenses at any given
time, 137 but Properties changed its policy in 2000 and elected to
continue on with an exclusive headwear license. 138 Reebok was the
highest bidder, was granted the license, and became the NFL’s
exclusive provider of headwear as of 2001. 139 Reebok’s exclusive
license will not expire until 2011. 140

131

Id.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See id.
136
Id. at 738.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
132
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Upon losing its license, American Needle filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 141 American
Needle made two separate arguments. First, it argued that the
exclusive apparel license granted to Reebok violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, because each individual franchise owns its own team
logos and trademarks. 142 So, when the teams charged Properties with
awarding an exclusive apparel license and Properties granted that
license to Reebok, the result was an illegal conspiracy “restrict[ing]
other vendors’ ability to obtain licenses for the teams’ intellectual
property. 143 Second, American Needle argued that an unlawful
monopoly was created when Properties granted Reebok its exclusive
headwear license. 144 According to American Needle, this monopoly
was created in the specialized market of NFL team licensing and
product wholesale. 145
The NFL defendants moved for summary judgment with regard to
American Needle’s Section 1 claim, citing the Supreme Court’s
holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 146 The NFL
defendants relied on the gradual extension of the rule laid down in
Copperweld—affiliated companies can be considered a single entity in
certain circumstances and therefore cannot violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in those circumstances. 147 The NFL defendants argued
that they should be considered a single entity when promoting the
league through the licensing of their respective intellectual property.148
Rather than file a brief in response to the NFL defendants’ motion,
American Needle filed a motion for a continuance under Federal Rule

141

American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans Lousiana Saints, 496 F.Supp.2d 941
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
142
American Needle, 538 F.3d at 738.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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of Civil Procedure Rule 56(f), 149 requested an opportunity to take
discovery on the issue of the NFL defendants’ single-entity defense,
and listed fifty-one discovery requests. 150 Following a struggle
regarding what evidence needed to be turned over to American
Needle, 151 the district court denied the Rule 56(f) motion and granted
the NFL defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding
American Needle’s Section 1 claim.
The district court’s ruling on the NFL defendants’ summary
judgment motion was largely based on the fact that Properties was
established in order to “promote NFL football” through collective
licensing. 152 The court concluded that these efforts to promote the
league as a whole through collective-licensing demonstrates that the
league and its member teams “act[] as an economic unit” and therefore
“should be deemed to be a single entity.” 153 The court used this
analysis to find that the NFL defendants, as a single entity, are unable

149

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides, “[if] a party opposing . . .
cannot . . . present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the
court may . . . order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had. . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(f). In essence, the rule
allows the non-moving party to argue to the court that it is unable to respond without
receiving more discovery materials from the moving party. Id.
150
American Needle, 538 F.3d at 739.
151
The NFL defendants objected to American Needle’s requests, arguing that
they were not limited to the defense that they had proffered. The NFL defendants did
ultimately offer a number of documents, and the court encouraged American Needle
to reduce the number of documents that it had requested while it reserved judgment
with regard to the objection that the NFL defendants raised. American Needle then
made yet more requests, causing the NFL defendants to again object. With this
further request and objection, the district court entered an order limiting discovery to
the NFL defendants’ single-entity defense and ordered the NFL defendants to
produce all documents with respect to that issue. The NFL defendants complied;
American Needle filed another motion under Rule 56(f) and made forty-nine more
requests, many of them the same requests made earlier. The court then took this
motion under advisement and compelled American Needle to respond to the motion
for summary judgment. Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
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to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 154 As a result of this
collective action, American Needle’s claim failed as a matter of law.
Following its decision on American Needle’s Section 1 claim, the
court requested that the two sides file briefs regarding American
Needle’s other claim—that the NFL defendants had created an illegal
monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 155 Upon receipt of the
briefs, the court came to the conclusion that its finding with regard to
American Needle’s Section 1 claim also caused the Section 2 claim to
fail, because single entities, such as the NFL and its teams, can license
their collective intellectual property to any number of licensees
without breaking antitrust laws. 156
American Needle appealed the district court’s decision to the
Seventh Circuit on two separate grounds: (1) the district court
improperly denied its Rule 56(f) motion prior to granting summary
judgment, and (2) the district court incorrectly granted the NFL
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both its Section 1 claim
and its Section 2 claim. 157 The Seventh Circuit applied an abuse of
discretion standard of review to American Needle’s first argument 158
and a de novo standard to its second. 159 When an abuse of discretion
standard of review is used, the appellate court must defer to the lower
court’s findings unless the appellate court finds that the lower court
exercised too much discretion in coming to its findings. De novo
review means that the appellate court can look at the entire record
from the lower court and can come to its own independent finding if
necessary. Pursuant to these standards of error, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed both of the district court’s findings. 160
With regard to its argument that the district court improperly
denied its Rule 56(f) motion, American Needle claimed that the
154

Id.
Id. at 740.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 741.
160
Id. at 744.
155
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district court allowed the NFL defendants to “control the flow of
information” by refusing to order the NFL defendants to turn over
documents that American Needle requested. 161 American Needle
further claimed that the district court failed to adequately explain its
decision. 162 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, saying that the court
adequately explained itself and, thereby, did not abuse its discretion. 163
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that in order for American Needle’s
motion to succeed, there needed to be some specific evidence that
American Needle could have obtained that would have created a
question of liability. 164 In other words, a party cannot simply “go
fishing” and expect the other side to be ordered to turn over any
evidence in its possession that goes against its argument. American
Needle argued that a single entity finding is “fact intensive,” but this
alone cannot require the NFL defendants to turn over any additional
evidence, because just because something is “fact intensive” does not
mean that the required facts are not included in what has already been
turned over. 165
The Seventh Circuit also denied American Needle’s second
argument, finding that the district court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the NFL defendants. 166 American Needle
contended that the district court erred in concluding that the NFL
defendants constitute a single entity under the rule from Copperweld,
and so were capable of violating Section 1. 167 The Seventh Circuit
admitted that this is a question that does not have a readily-identifiable
answer, and the court pointed out that in some instances, the singleentity formulation seems apt, while in others, a professional sports
league is more properly described as a joint venture among a

161

Id. at 740.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 741.
166
Id. at 744.
167
Id. at 741.
162

24
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/2

24

Gunderson: The Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Doctrine in <em>American Needle I

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 4, Issue 1

Fall 2008

collection of independently-owned teams. 168 The court cites to Bulls II
in pointing out that the league is a “single source” for purposes of
entertainment and that the teams produce “one product”—the league’s
games. 169 However, the court also cites to Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
in pointing out that when a person seeks employment in such a league,
the teams act as separate entities that each have the ability to hire and
fire their own employees. 170
IV. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit made a well-informed and considered
decision in American Needle v. National Football League. In past
cases, the idea of single-entity treatment for sports leagues has been
considered, but it has not been accepted with respect to all questions
and all aspects of the league. 171 This represents a judicial minimalist
viewpoint toward single-entity treatment, and courts should continue
to follow this model, despite compelling arguments to treat sports
leagues in other ways, such as joint ventures 172 or even treating the
individual franchises as separate, individual entities.
The Seventh Circuit wisely elected to follow the path begun by
more recent intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine cases and decided
only what it had to in order to resolve this particular case. The effect
was that the court neither over- nor under-reached while making its
calculated decision in American Needle. Though the Seventh Circuit’s
decision neither has a large direct impact on existing law nor created
any new precedent to be followed by other courts, the decision in
American Needle is important because it shows antitrust law’s
continued evolution away from the seemingly incongruous results
created by the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
168

Id.
Id.
170
Id.
171
See Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball
Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006).
172
See id at 601–06 (Cudahy, Circuit Judge, concurring).
169
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A. Courts Should Use Incremental Advancement of Single-Entity
Status in Antitrust Cases
Judicial minimalism is the idea that each case that comes in front
of a court presents its own facts and its own unique questions and
these questions should be answered with respect to that particular
case’s facts. 173 In other words, judicial minimalists hold that court
decisions should not contain broad statements of law, but rather that
each case should be decided individually and that law should move
and evolve slowly and incrementally. To this point in time, the single
entity concept has moved in this way—Copperweld began the
movement by allowing a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary to be
treated as a single actor with respect to questions arising under the
Sherman Act; 174 Bulls II advances the idea that the National
Basketball Association (NBA) could be treated as a single entity with
respect to creating television contracts; 175 Mt. Pleasant v. Associated
Electric Co. involves an electric cooperative that was treated as a
single firm; 176 and even the Professional Golf Association (a collection
of individual players) has been treated as a single entity. 177
A judicial minimalist approach to the single-entity concept will
help protect against potentially unforeseen problems that can
accompany unwarranted expansion of the law. For instance, the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in American Needle and the Supreme
Court’s holding in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. demonstrate that even
one league can raise questions that would be answered in different
ways. In American Needle, the Seventh Circuit held that the league
and its teams should be considered one entity with respect to
173

See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1455 (2000).
174
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
175
See Bulls II, 95 F.3d 593.
176
See Mt. Pleasant v. Associate Electric Cooperative, 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.
1988).
177
See Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers’ Ass’n of America,
878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994).
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trademark licensing. 178 However, in Brown, the Supreme Court noted
that players coming into the league would see each team as an
individual employer with the ability to hire and fire employees and
sign and cut players. 179 Had American Needle been decided before
Brown, and had the Seventh Circuit made a broad pronouncement that
the NFL and its teams are to be treated as a single entity, the issues in
Brown likely would never have been raised and considered on their
own merits. The court would not have been given the opportunity to
decide the case in the way in which it did, because the court would not
have had the discretion to be selective regarding when to treat a
professional sports league as a single entity and when to treat it as a
collection of individual entities.
On the other hand, allowing courts to use their discretion to treat
the league as a single entity in some cases and as separate entities in
others could conceivably create confusion. Additionally, this discretion
will create a situation in which courts often will not be able to rely on
precedent because an independent inquiry would have to be conducted
regarding each aspect of an entity. This inability to rely on precedent
threatens to further burden an already busy judiciary that could benefit
from a reduction in appeals and an increase in settlements. Despite this
drawback, however, courts should continue to follow this path,
because the league does not always act as either a single entity or a
collection of separate entities at all times. This approach, while
potentially inconsistent, is likely to produce the fairest results.

178

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir.

2008).
179

Id. at 741 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248–249

(1996)).
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B. The NFL Should Be Considered a Single-Entity With Respect to
Intellectual Property Licensing for Apparel
The Seventh Circuit made the right conclusions while analyzing
the NFL defendants’ argument that they should be treated as a single
entity with respect to potential violations under the Sherman Act in
American Needle v. National Football League. There are three reasons
why the court made the right holding: (1) the NFL and its codefendants made a compelling argument that they produce one
product, namely “NFL football;” 180 (2) the NFL’s history indicates that
it created Properties for the purpose of marketing and promoting the
league and its product as a whole; 181 and (3) the pertinent market in
American Needle should be drawn more broadly and encompass more
than simply “NFL apparel.”
1. “NFL Football”: A Unique Product
The Seventh Circuit held that the NFL and its member teams
create a single product that can be identified as “NFL football.” 182 The
Seventh Circuit cites to several sources of very persuasive authority in
holding that NFL football constitutes a unique product that is produced
by the thirty-two NFL franchises and the league itself. The Seventh
Circuit points to a Supreme Court decision in which the Court quotes
Robert Bork’s book, The Antitrust Paradox, in which Bork creates a
hypothetical professional lacrosse league and points out that it would
be fruitless for the league to be held as violating the Sherman Act
because there are no other leagues. 183 The Seventh Circuit also cites to
itself in the Bulls II decision in which it argues that “the NBA has no
existence independent of sports. It makes professional basketball; only
180

Id. at 743.
Id. at 737.
182
Id. at 743.
183
Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 101 (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978))).
Note: Bork’s book was written before there was a professional lacrosse league in the
United States.
181
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it can make ‘NBA Basketball’ games . . . .” 184 This point about the
NBA is a valid one, as NCAA basketball is a popular sport in its own
right, and provides a unique experience when compared to the
NBA. 185 In much the same way, NFL Football is a product that is
distinct from NCAA football. For example, NCAA football is
generally played on Saturdays as opposed to Sundays, has its own
unique championship system distinct from the NFL’s, 186 and has
separate television contracts,187 among other differences.
Granted, NFL Football and college football are not exactly
analogous, because the NFL features professional athletes, while (at
least in theory) NCAA football features amateurs. 188 Perhaps the most
convincing argument that NFL Football is a unique product is that two
rival professional football leagues, the United States Football League
(USFL) 189 and the XFL 190 have been created in the past thirty years
and the fact that neither remains in existence today demonstrates that
neither served as a viable alternative to the NFL.
Even leagues that were created without the intention of being a
direct competitor to the NFL have failed. For example, in 1990, the
World League of American Football (WLAF) was formed with the

184

Id. (quoting Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National
Basketball Association (Bulls II), 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2006)).
185
CBS signed a contract extension with the NCAA in 1999 to pay $6 billion
for the rights to televise the NCAA basketball tournament. CBS Renews NCAA
B’Ball, CNN MONEY, Nov. 18, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/11/18/news/ncaa/
(last visited November 12, 2008).
186
Bowl Championship Series, http://www.bcsfootball.org (last visited
November 12, 2008).
187
See Notre Dame agrees to five-year extension with NBC, ESPN, June 19,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3452161 (last visited November
12, 2008).
188
NCAA Operating Bylaw Art.12.01.1 (2008).
189
See The History of the USFL 1982–1986,
http://www.remembertheusfl.8m.com/history.html (last visited November 12, 2008).
190
See C.W. Nevius, Extinct: NBC, WWF pull the plug on XFL after just one
season of anything-goes football, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2001, at A-1.
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support of the NFL 191 and lasted only two seasons. 192 Two years went
by before the league was resumed under the name “World League,”
and some form of the revamped league continued on until 2007, when
the league was disbanded. 193 Even since the league went under in
2007, the NFL has continued to play a regular season game each
season in London, 194 from which one can infer that the failure of the
league was not due to the fact that it was football being played, but
rather that it was not NFL Football being played.
That NFL Football is a unique entertainment product justifies its
treatment as a single entity in American Needle. The argument can be
made that if the league were not treated as a single entity in some
respects, it would be at a severe disadvantage when competing against
other types of entertainment, such as network and cable television, the
motion picture industry, and even popular vacation destinations, such
as Disneyland. All of these other competitors in the “entertainment
business” can all create their products alone, whereas NFL Football is
only created when at least two teams are affiliated into a league and
play one another. Furthermore, while it is conceivable that an
individual team could fail economically, the league would likely go
on, albeit with one fewer team.

191

History, http://worldleagueofamericanfootball.com/id23.html (last visited
November 12, 2008).
192
Id.
193
The league later went by the name NFL Europe and later NFL Europa but
still failed. NFL Folds Europe League, to Focus on Regular-Season Games Abroad,
ESPN, June 29, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2920738 (last
visited November 12, 2008).
194
Wembley to host Dolphins & Giants,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/other_sports/american_football/6248825.stm (last
visited November 12, 2008); NFL Chargers/Saints Wembley clash sure to be a sellout, Daily Mail Online, June 27, 2008,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/othersports/article-1029997/NFL-Chargers-SaintsWembley-clash-certain-sell-out.html (last visited November 12, 2008).
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2. The NFL Created NFL Properties With the Goal of Promoting the
Teams and the League as a Whole
Judge Kanne’s Seventh Circuit opinion in American Needle listed
this reason as being the most important for determining that in this
case, the NFL was acting as a single entity. 195 Judge Kanne noted that
“since 1963, the NFL teams have acted as one source of economic
power—under the auspices of NFL Properties—to license their
intellectual property collectively and to promote NFL Football.” 196
The American Needle opinion even goes so far as to quote NFL
Properties’ Articles of Incorporation as saying that its purpose is “[t]o
conduct and engage in advertising campaigns and promotional
ventures on behalf of the [NFL] and the member [teams].” 197
Therefore, as a result of forming NFL Properties in 1963, the league
has actively engaged in a collective effort to promote and further the
league as a whole in its efforts to compete against other forms of
entertainment. That NFL Properties was created, coupled with the
mission that it was given indicates that the league was aware of its
need to raise its profile as a whole in order to compete in the
entertainment world.
3. The Market Should Be Drawn Narrowly for Analysis in Antitrust
Cases
It may seem strange, but for the purpose of an antitrust law
analysis or other competition-related liability, such as trademark
violations, the market analyzed can be just as important, if not more
so, than the behavior itself that is alleged to violate the law.
An example from the realm of trademark law is useful for the
purpose of illustration. In Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v.
Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., the question posed was whether one
195

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th
Cir. 2008).
196
Id.
197
Id.
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producer of silverware had violated the trademark of another. 198 The
Second Circuit’s decision turned, in part, on what the relevant market
for the silverware was—the court held that the relevant market was
that for baroque-style silverware, not silverware in general and found
no trademark violation. 199
For the purpose of antitrust law, the analysis should be the
opposite of that used in Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. If the
NFL’s single entity argument is accepted and the thirty-two NFL
franchises are treated as a single-entity creating a single product to
compete in the broad entertainment market, then it follows that the
market for apparel would be similarly broadened to encompass the
apparel of other entities. Under this analysis, Minnesota Vikings
apparel would not be held to compete against Chicago Bears apparel;
rather, the two would together compete against, for example, Major
League Baseball (MLB) apparel and NBA apparel, and even licensed
apparel for television shows and movies.
If the NFL’s exclusive ten-year, $250 million apparel contract 200
with Reebok is any indication, there is a lot of money to be made in
licensed-apparel. Though not exclusive like the NFL’s contract, MLB
signed contracts in 2003 with seven apparel manufacturers collectively
worth about $500 million over five years. 201

198

Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
199
Id. at 81.
200
Richard Sandomir, Pro Football; Reebok Strikes Exclusive Deal With
N.F.L., NEW YORK TIMES, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9C0DE0D71039F933A15751C1A9669C8B63 (last visited
November 12, 2008).
201
Barry M. Bloom, MLB Signs New Apparel Agreements, MLB.COM, Aug. 4,
2003,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20030804&content_id=460263&vkey=ne
ws_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb (last visited November 12, 2008).
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in American Needle, Inc. v.
National Football League, while not overly surprising given the
trajectory of the antitrust law in the wake of Copperweld, provides a
good example of courts resolving single entity questions as they arise
and not making overly broad holdings that will handcuff courts in
future situations. Courts should continue along the Seventh Circuit’s
path and continue to develop this area of antitrust law gradually,
without making sweeping policy holdings.
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